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MEXICAN TRANSMIGRATION: A CASE FOR THE
APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
"Between strength and weakness, the desert."
- Lerdo de Tejada'
Over a century ago, Mexican President Lerdo de Tejada recog-
nized the need for his weak nation to remain separated from the
powerful giant to the north. Today the desert is inhabited by both
Americans and Mexicans and is no longer a buffer between the two
nations. Mexicans, as a result of this proximity to the United
States, are finding expatriation the most expedient solution to the
poverty situation in Mexico.2 Illegal entry or "transmigration"3
into the United States has, since the 1940s, increased steadily to its
current alarming proportions.4
The United States government has utilized several policy
tools5 in its attempt to stop transmigration, but its overall immigra-
tion policy remains unclear.6 In October 1978, Congress estab-
lished a sixteen-member Select Commission on Immigration and
Refugee Policy,7 also known as the Askew Commission.8 The
1. J. BAZANT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF MEXICO 93 (1977). Compare to this the state-
ment of Pope John XXIII: "The contrast between nations that are economically advanced
and enjoy a high standard of living, and those in earlier stages of development which suffer
from extreme poverty is therefore called one of the most difficult problems facing the modern
world." POPE JOHN XXIII, ENCYCLICAL ON CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIAL PROGRESS 119
(1961).
2. See V. BRIGGS, MEXICO MIGRATION AND THE U.S. LABOR MARKET 22 (1975); see
also text accompanying notes 78-88 infra.
3. The purpose of this Comment is to examine transmigration as an international phe-
nomenon. Terms such as "illegal aliens," "undocumented workers," and "wetbacks" are
therefore avoided where possible. These terms denote an illegality that is associated with
United States law and not international law. Mexicans illegally entering the United States
will be referred to as "transmigrants." For the purposes of this Comment, the words "trans-
migrant" and "transmigration" are derived from the Spanish word transmigrar which means
to go from one country to another.
4. U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, ANNUAL RE-
PORT OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 13-14 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as 1976 INS REPORT].
5. See text accompanying notes 95-127 infra.
6. INS Hals Most 'Raids'on Factoriesfor Illegal,41iens, L.A. Times, Oct. I1, 1978, pt.
I, at I, col. 3; Conine, llegals- Millions, but How Many Millions?, L.A. Times, Oct. 9, 1978,
pt. II, at 7, col. 3.
7. Immigration and Nationality Act-Refugee Policy, Pub. L. No. 95-412, § 4, 92 Stat.
907 (1978).
8. Maxwell, Illegal immigration: the Mexican perspective, L.A. Times, July 15, 1979,
special report, at 30, col. I.
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Commission was "instructed to study and evaluate 'existing laws,
policies and procedures governing the admission of immigrants and
refugees to the United States and to make such administrative and
legislative recommendations to the President and the Congress as
are appropriate,' not later than September 30, 1980."' In effect, the
legislation creating the Commission is a decree of inaction that will
await the findings of the Commission."° In the interim, the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS) is the only government
agency formulating policy on transmigration, and it has relaxed en-
forcement of immigration laws under former INS Commissioner,
Leonel J. Castillo."
The United States government's "hands-off" policy on trans-
migration is the result of political pressure from many sides.' 2 Sev-
eral Chicano' 3 groups promote the legalization of transmigration,
anxious to reinforce the Chicano political power base. 14  Other
Chicanos oppose transmigration, feeling transmigrants limit em-
ployment opportunities for Mexican aliens legally in the United
States.' 5 In addition, they believe that transmigration lowers the
standard of living and social status of all persons of Mexican or
Spanish descent living in the United States, whether they are citi-
zens or legal aliens.' 6 American citizens who compete with trans-
migrants for low-wage employment also oppose transmigration,1
7
but American employers welcome transmigration as a source of
9. H.R. REP. No. 1206, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978), (quoting H.R. 12443, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2, 4 (1978)).
10. Conine, supra note 6.
1I. INS Halts Most 'Raids' on Factories for Illegal Aliens, supra note 6. But see D. C
Arrests Could Signal Crackdown On Employers OfIllegalAliens, San Diego Union, Nov. 18,
1978, § A, at 11, col. 1. INS policies took an about-face after the resignation of Castillo's
predecessor Leonard F. Chapman, a retired Marine general. Castillo, a Carter appointee,
was not popular among those who would like to see the transmigrants driven back. In par-
ticular, Border Patrol officers of the INS found Castillo's policies made their job more diffi-
cult. Castillo Has Hamstrung Them, INS Agents Say, L.A. Times, Nov. I1, 1978, pt. 1, at 1,
col. 1; "It's Your Turn in the Sun, "TIME, Oct. 16, 1978, at 61. Castillo resigned on September
30, 1979, and was replaced by Acting Commissioner David Crosman, formerly General
Counsel for the INS. It appears Crosman will increase enforcement efforts. See Memoran-
dum from Donald M. Cameron, Chief Patrol Agent, INS, Chula Vista, California, to all
personnel (Oct. 5, 1979) (copy on file with the Caliornia Western International Law Journal).
12. IllegalAliens Stir Competing Power Blocs, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1978, § 5, at 4, col.
3. An added aspect of the political picture is Mexico's natural gas, which the United States
would like to buy. See note 218 infra.
13. As used in this Comment, "Chicano" refers to American citizens of Mexican de-
scent politically active in the United States.
14. Illegal Aliens Stir Competing Power Blocs, supra note 12.
15. See note 52 infra, and accompanying text.
16. "It's Your Turn in the Sun", supra note 11.
17. Id.
2
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cheap labor.'8
There is a shortage of statistical studies examining the magni-
tude of Mexican transmigration and its impact on the United
States, and neither the United States nor Mexico' 9 are encouraging
effective studies. Nevertheless, government officials, including for-
mer United States Attorney General Griffin Bell, Secretary of
Labor F. Ray Marshall, and several Congressmen, including Rep-
resentatives Peter Rodino and James Scheuer, are aware of the
need for a more aggressive policy on transmigration. 20  As more
Americans become aware of the problem and how it affects them,
the United States government will be forced to reconcile political
differences and formulate a direct policy on transmigration. 2'
This Comment suggests a new foreign policy approach
whereby the United States and Mexico can negotiate a solution to
the transmigration problem. The first section examines the magni-
tude and character of transmigration from Mexico into the United
States; the negative effects of transmigration experienced on the
American side; the forces causing transmigration; and, the failure
of United States immigration policy to curb transmigration. The
second section discusses the guidelines needed to formulate a new
foreign policy. These guidelines comprise the rights and duties of
Mexico and the United States regarding transmigration, resulting
from treaties, agreements, conventions, and fundamental principles
of international law. Finally, this Comment recommends that
Mexico and the United States take specific action following those
guidelines to resolve the transmigration problem.
18. Illegal Aliens Stir Competing Power Blocs, supra note 12.
19. Conine, supra note 6; Rochin, IllegalAliens in Agriculture Some Theoretical Consid-
erations, 29 LAB. L.J. 149, 151 (1978). But see H.R.J. Res. 422, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
The Act would amend the Immigration and Nationality Act "to encourage the participation
of Undocumented aliens in the 1980 December Census" by granting immunity "from depor-
tation or exclusion based on their provision of census information." Id. at 1-2.
20. Pessimism Expressed Measures Will Pass, San Diego Union, Nov. 18, 1978, § A, at
1, col. 4 (statement of then United States Attorney General Griffin Bell); Illegal Aliens -
Whereto Draw the Line, L.A. Times, Nov. I1, 1978, pt. 1, at 1, col. I (statement of Secretary
of Labor F. Ray Marshall); IllegalAliens, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 29, 1979, at 38
(statement of Representative James H. Scheuer). For a discussion of the efforts made by
Representative Rodino, see text accompanying note 120 infra.
21. Pessimism Expressed Measures Will Pass, supra note 20. Already, vigilante groups
have threatened to take the law into their own hands in personal frustration over the ineffec-
tiveness of legal enforcement. See Ku Klux Klan Plans Border Patrol To Help Fight Illegal
Alien Problem, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1977, § 1, at 80, col. 5; see also Conine, supra note 6;
"It"s Your Turn in the Sun", supra note 11.
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I. MEXICAN TRANSMIGRATION
Mexico City and the United States have become the principal
destinations in a radical redistribution of population from rural
areas in Mexico.22 The fact that the population of Mexico's capital
city has quadrupled since 1965 is an indication of this phenomenal
rate of redistribution.23 Zero Population Growth, Inc., maintains
that the rate of population growth in the United States is being
doubled by the influx of Mexican transmigrants 4 There is also an
indirect affect of transmigration on population growth in the
United States, because female transmigrants have, on the average,
more children than do American women. According to projec-
tions, transmigration - direct and indirect affects combined - will
soon treble the rate of population growth in the United States.26
"Guestimates" of the number of transmigrants living in the
United States range from four to twelve million. The most reli-
able figure is an estimate of eight million28 made by former INS
Commissioner, Leonard F. Chapman.29
Recent events indicate that the rate of transmigration contin-
ues to rise.3" In the summer of 1977, President Carter announced
his "amnesty plan"'" for transmigrants living in the United States.
22. J. SAMORA, Los MOJADos: THE WETBACK STORY 9 (1971); BRIGGS, supra note 2,
at 22.
23. 1968 INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 733; 1979 THE WORLD ALMANAC 559.
24. IllegalAliens: Hearings on H. . 982 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Immi-
gration, Citizenship and Int'l L. of the Comm. of the Judiciary, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 254
(1975)(statement of John H. Tanton) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 982].
25. Illustrative is the fact that Mexico is experiencing a 50% greater increase in popula-
tion than is the United States. Davis, The Migrations of Human Populations, SCIENTIFIC
AM., Sept. 1974, at 103; see also Reston, The Silent Invasion, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1977, § 1, at
23, col. 1.
26. DOMESTIC COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON ILLEGAL ALIENS, PRELIMINARY REPORT 204
(1976) [hereinafter cited as DOMESTIC COUNCIL].
27. The former Commissioner, Leonel Castillo, believes the range is three to five mil-
lion. Maxwell, supra note 8. Senator Kennedy reports the findings of two demographic
statisticians who find the number to be around four million. 125 CONG. REC. S8481 (daily
ed. June 25, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). For other "guestimates," see Illegal Aliens,
supra note 20.
28. Hearings on HR. 982, supra note 24, at 32 (statement of Leonard F. Chapman).
29. The estimates are made from the only reliable data available - the number of
apprehensions made each year by the Border Patrol, an enforcement division of the INS.
For fiscal year 1976, the INS reported the location of 875,915 transmigrants, 89% of whom
were Mexican. Apprehended transmigrants totaled 781,474 for the year. 1976 INS REPORT,
supra note 4, at 13-14. Note that the estimated eight million transmigrants represent about
one-eighth of Mexico's entire population and about one-fourth of the adult population of
Mexico. 1979 THE WORLD ALMANAC 559; Conine, supra note 6.
30. See notes 33-34 infra.
31. Carter Said to Seek 4mnestyfor Aliens in Country 7 years, N.Y. Times, July 21,
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Although the plan was never implemented, 32 its announcement in-
duced a sudden influx of transmigrants.33 Even more recently, a
reordering of priorities under former INS Commissioner Castillo
produced an estimated seventy percent reduction in the number of
arrests and deportations of transmigrants.34 Such reduced enforce-
ment will likely produce a further increase in the rate of transmi-
gration.35
Population growth is a major cause of economic pressure in
Mexico;36 likewise, population growth due to transmigration is a
burden on the American economy. 37 Signals indicating the magni-
tude of this burden include unemployment, increased "dollar
drain," and an added usage of public services.38
A. Effects of Transmigration In the United States
1. Unemployment. Primarily, transmigrants are seeking em-
ployment in the United States, and nearly all of them eventually
find jobs.3 9 Because most transmigrants are unskilled, their com-
petitors in the search for employment are also unskilled.40 This cat-
egory includes most women, teenagers, uneducated persons,
disabled persons, and other Mexicans who legally seek work in the
United States.4 ' The extent to which transmigrants may be displac-
1977, § 1, at 1, col. i. Carter's proposal was finally filed by Representative Rodino on Oct.
12, 1977 (H.R. 9531, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977)) and by Senators Eastland and Kennedy on
Oct. 28, 1977 (S.2252, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977)). See note 120 infra.
32. Conine, supra note 6.
33. Increase in IllegalAliens Linked to Amnesty Plan, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1977, § 1, at
16, col. 6; 200,000 at Tituana Wait to be Smuggled into U.S. by Deadline, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8,
1977, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
34. INS Halts Most 'Raids'on Factoriesfor Illegal Aliens, supra note 6. But see D.C
Arrests Could Signal Crackdown On Employers of Illegal Aliens, supra note ii.
35. See DOMESTIC COUNCIL, supra note 26, at 48; Illegal Aliens - Where to Draw the
Line, supra note 20, at 29, col. 2.
36. Conine, supra note 6.
37. But see "'It's Your Turn in the Sun," supra note II (A 1975 Department of Labor
study concluded that transmigrants provide a net benefit to the United States economy);
Maxwell, supra note 8, at 30-31 (Economist Clark W. Reynolds believes transmigration is an
economic boon to the United States).
38. In a message to Congress, President Carter stated: "In the last several years, mil-
lions of undocumented aliens have illegally immigrated to the United States. They have
breached our nation's immigration laws, displaced many American citizens from jobs, and
placed an increased financial burden on many state and local governments." 13 WEEKLY
COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1170 (Aug. 8, 1977). See text accompanying notes 39-73 infra.
39. See BRIGGS, supra note 2, at 13.
40. DOMESTIC COUNCIL, supra note 26, at 156.
41. Id. at 160. Jack Ricciardi, Assistant District Director of Investigations for the INS
in New York City, said: "How many black teen-agers are pounding the streets looking for
jobs? Forty per cent? Many of them can't get jobs because of illegal aliens." Illegal Mexican
Vol. 10
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ing Americans in the job market is significant when one considers
that the estimated number of transmigrants in the United States
exceeds the total number of unemployed Americans.
42
Defenders of transmigration contend that no competition ex-
ists, because transmigrants perform work unsavory to Americans.43
The contention is deceptive, however, if transmigration tends to de-
press wages and working conditions below the level most Ameri-
cans will accept." Generally, an increased supply of labor
produces such conditions.45 As an added factor, transmigrants are
willing to work for lower than standard wages, and employers often
exploit that willingness.46
Defenders of transmigration insist, nevertheless, that Ameri-
cans alone could not satisfy the farm labor needs of the United
States.47 An historical example suggests the contrary. The use of
Mexican farm labor in the United States was encouraged under the
Bracero program from 1941 until 1965.48 Farm labor employers
did not believe the American labor market would fulfill their em-
ployment needs for harvest when the program was discontinued,
yet harvest labor demands were satisfied using legal aliens and
Americans.49
Currently, a Mexican national can work legally in the United
States by obtaining a "green card." He must meet all the require-
ments of the Immigration and Nationality Act5 and obtain labor
certification from the Secretary of Labor showing that:
(A) there are not sufficient workers in the United States who
are able, willing, qualified, and available at the time of applica-
Aliens Now Flowing to Northeast U.S., L.A. Times, Aug. 15, 1979, pt. I-B, at 3, col. 1. See
also note 52 infra. In an interview, Secretary of Labor Marshall said: "We're getting a
larger and larger pool of people in the country illegally. . . . This hurts low-wage Ameri-
can workers - minorities, women, and young people." Eaton, IllegalAliens Called Harmful
to Economy, L.A. Times, Aug. 22, 1979, pt. 1, at 4, col. I.
42. A New Marshall Plan?, N.Y. Times, March 13, 1977, § 4, at 23, ol. 2. See also
Conine, supra note 6. The article points out that if just half of the 3.8 million jobs believed to
be held by transmigrants could be shifted to American citizens, unemployment in the United
States would be reduced to less than five percent, and the federal budget could be cut in half.
43. Echeverria Tells Alien Status in U.S., San Diego Union, July 7, 1974, § A, at 8, col.
3; llegal Aliens - Where to Draw the Line, supra note 20, at 29.
44. BRIGGS, supra note 2, at 26.
45. 1976 INS REPORT, supra note 4, at 15.
46. BRIGGS, supra note 2, at 26; Conine, supra note 6; Eaton, supra note 41.
47. IllegalAliens - Where to Draw the Line, supra note 20, at 29.
48. For an account of the Bracero or Mexican Farm Labor Program, see SAMORA,
supra note 22, at 18-19.
49. IllegalAliens - Where to Draw the Line, supra note 20, at 29.
50. The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-503(1952).
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tion for a visa and admission to the United States and at a place
to which the alien is destined to perform such skilled or unskilled
labor, and
(B) the employment of such aliens will not adversely affect
the wages and working conditions of the workers in the United
States similarly employed. 5'
Even these so-called green card workers are finding it difficult to
compete with transmigrants 2
Even if it could be proved that transmigrants exclusively pro-
vide needed farm labor, farm laborers are not the only segment of
the population with which transmigrants are competing. A recent
study53 reveals that only twenty-seven percent of apprehended
male transmigrants are working as farm laborers. The other sev-
enty-three percent are working in service, blue collar, and even
white collar jobs according to the study.-4 This explains why more
transmigrants are being found in major urban and suburban areas
each year. 5 According to Leonard Chapman, former INS Com-
missioner:
I often hear that the illegal aliens are taking only jobs that Amer-
icans won't take, but that is absolutely not true. I am talking
about jobs in construction, in services in light and heavy industry
throughout the country.
We apprehend technicians working for $18,000 to $20,000 a
year, construction foremen making $9.50 an hour. 6
No one contends that only transmigrants compete for these kinds of
employment.
Employers often argue they would be priced out of their mar-
kets if forced to pay higher wages to legal employees. 7 In the long
run, at least, this argument fails because industries facing high la-
bor costs tend to become capital intensive in order to lower their
costs to competitive levels within the industry.58 The argument also
assumes that the supply of legal labor in the affected industries is
51. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14)(1976).
52. Idled Green Card Workers Angered By Illegal Aliens, San Diego Union, March 12,
1976, § B, at 1, col. 4. "Green card" workers have even sought relief under the laws of
California. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
53. DOMESTIC COUNCIL, supra note 26, at 169.
54. Id. See, e.g., 13 4liens Captured, Worked in Gun Shop, San Diego Union, Nov. 9,
1975, § B, at 1, col. 5 (transmigrants were receiving from $2.00 to $2.50 an hour); Alien Check
Nets 8 on Hotel Staff, San Diego Union, Feb. 2, 1976, § B, at 3, col. 5.
55. Conine, supra note 6; see note 94 infra, and accompanying text.
56. Illegal 4lien Problem Remains Severe, Unresolved, San Diego Union, Dec. 12, 1976,
§ C, at 7, col. 1.
57. DOMESTIC COUNCIL, supra note 26, at 160-61.
58. A. KoUTSOYIANNIS, MODERN MICROECONOMICS 86-92 (1975).
Vol. 10
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inelastic and that demand for the items produced in those indus-
tries is elastic. 9 In other words, it is assumed industries could only
induce adequate increases in the supply of "legal" workers by in-
creases in wages and that they would experience fatal revenue
losses if forced thereby to raise their prices. This assumption is un-
founded.6'
Transmigrants are working in the United States and are com-
peting successfully with Americans for their employment. Trans-
migration is, therefore, contributing to unemployment in the
United States. Unemployment is not only significant to those un-
employed, it is a major signal of a nation's economic stability or
instability.6' Both Mexico and the United States recognize the need
to protect their own employment rates by restricting the number of
aliens that may be employed within their boundaries.62
2. Dollar drain. Another economic concern, related to the
employment of transmigrants, is how transmigrants use the wages
they earn in the United States. Most of the money earned by trans-
migrants is sent home to support families and relatives and to accu-mulate in savings.63 This outflow of dollars to Mexico contributes
to "dollar drain" in the United States64 by an estimated three to ten
billion dollars annually.65 A dollar drain of this magnitude threat-
ens the United States economic stability by exacerbating the bal-
ance-of-payments deficit66 and hampering government attempts to
control the United States money supply.67 Transmigration is,
therefore, a direct threat to the stability of the United States econ-
omy.6
8
59. DOMESTIC COUNCIL, supra note 26, at 161.
60. Id.
61. D. PIERCE & D. SHAW, MONETARY ECONOMICS: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND POLICY
424 (1974).
62. Mexico's New Labor Law, effective May i, 1970, requires that 90% of workers in
every enterprise be Mexican. See VII MARTINDALE-HUBBEL LAW DIRECTORY 3766 (11 lth
ed. 1979). For examples of legislation in the United States, see notes 115-16 iffra.
63. BRIGGS, supra note 2, at 20. For a cameo setting, see SAN DIEGO COUNTY HUMAN
RESOURCES AGENCY, A STUDY OF THE SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACT OF ILLEGAL ALIENS ON
THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 62-63 (Jan. 1977). Although San Diego County comprises only
3.3% of the United States-Mexican border, it accounts for 43% of the total apprehensions
made along the entire border.
64. Dollar Drain Laid to Illegal Aliens Estimated in the Billions Annually, N.Y. Times,
May 27, 1977, § 1, at 9, col. 4.
65. Id., citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, IL-
LEGAL ALIENS POLICY ANALYSIS (Oct. 1975)(prepared for the INS by I.C.F., Inc.).
66. Hearings on HR. 982, supra note 24, at 33 (statement of Leonard F. Chapman).
67. See generally PIERCE & SHAW, supra note 61, at 424-37.
68. By stopping transmigration and the dollar drain caused by it, a substantial portion
8
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3. Use of social services. Transmigrants, while living in the
United States, use the public and welfare services of their commu-
nity.69 These public services include police and fire protection, law
enforcement, education, water and sewage treatment, highway con-
struction, and park and recreational facilities. The INS reports that
the tax contributon of transmigrants does not compensate for the
cost of these services.7"
Transmigrant use of welfare services includes general assist-
ance, supplementary security income, medicaid, food stamps, social
security, unemployment insurance, and aid to families with depen-
dent children.7' The INS has estimated the annual receipt of wel-
fare benefits by transmigrants to be $13 billion.72 Furthermore, this
figure does not include welfare and unemployment benefits re-
ceived by Americans who are unemployed as a result of transmi-
gration.73
Transmigration increases economic pressure in the United
States. Transmigrants who displace United States workers cause
unemployment; transmigrants who send their wages home to Mex-
ico contribute to dollar drain in the United States; transmigrants, as
a group, do not pay adequately for the public services they receive;
and many transmigrants receive welfare payments illegally from
the United States government. Before discussing United States at-
of the United States balance-of-payments deficit - more than three billion dollars - could
be abated. See Hearings on H.R. 982, supra note 24, at 33 (statement of Leonard F.
Chapman).
69. See notes 70-73 infra.
70. In a three-month test conducted by the Internal Revenue Service at INS detention
centers, 1,090 of the 1,699 transmigrants interviewed had paid only about 67% of the taxes
they owed. DOMESTIC COUNCIL, supra note 26, at 151; see Hearings on HR. 982, supra note
24, at 33-34; U.S. To Bolster Border Force In lllegalAlien Crackdown - All-out Operation
Has Top Priority, San Diego Union, Sept. 19, 1974, § B, at I, col. 6; see also The Silent
Invasion, supra note 25. But see It's Hispanics' Turn 4t U.S. City Gates, San Diego Union,
May 6, 1979, § C, at 7, col. 1; Analyst Says Mexicans' Taxes Here Offset Health Cost, San
Diego Union, June 3, 1979, § B, at 8, col. 1. The article refers to sales taxes paid by Mexican
shoppers who enter the United States legally.
71. A Los Angeles County grand jury found that 3,500 transmigrants were receiving
assistance in the form of welfare benefits totaling 3.7 million dollars, and in the form of
medical care totaling 10.8 million dollars. .4 Falling Peso Spurs Illegal Immigration, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 9, 1977, § 3, at 43, col. I; see also DOMESTIC COUNCIL, supra note 26, at 192.
When officials in Los Angeles were able to terminate payments to another 2,600 trans-
migrants who had been receiving welfare payments, an estimated 2.7 million dollars was
saved. Id.; 1976 INS REPORT, supra note 4, at 16.
72. DOMESTIC COUNCIL, supra note 26, at 193; Illegal Aliens, supra note 20, at 39.
73. See Fear Persists - Illegal Alien Lives Hard, Lonely Life, San Diego Union, Dec.
27, 1974, § B, at 1, col. 7.
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tempts to halt transmigration, it is necessary to consider the forces
motivating Mexicans to expatriate.
B. Causes of Transmigration
A dual set of forces compels Mexicans to forsake their home-
land for the hostile, dissimilar environment of the United States.74
The forces - known as "push" and "pull" forces7 5 - are present
in any sizable migration.76 People tend to be pushed from de-
pressed regions and pulled to destinations where conditions are
more favorable.77
In Mexico, lower-class Mexicans are living in extreme pov-
erty.7" Although recently Mexico has been experiencing a
favorable economic growth rate, her population continues to grow
at a faster rate,79 causing economic depression.80 Simply stated, de-
mand continues to outgrow production. Furthermore, economic
growth is experienced by only a small percentage of upper-income
Mexicans,8 ' because the distribution of wealth and income in
Mexico disproportionately favors this group. 2 The vast lower-in-
come group is experiencing high unemployment - thirty to forty
percent s3 - and declining living standards.84 Community services
are inadequate, health care is poor,8 5 and the illiteracy rate is over
twenty-three percent.86 Despite domestic pleas to remedy the situa-
tion, the Mexican government has refused to accept any direct for-
eign assistance. 7 There is no doubt, however, that the Mexican
government recognizes transmigration to be an indirect form of aid
74. See notes 75-94 infra, and accompanying text.
75. DOMESTIC COUNCIL, supra note 26, at 47.
76. Davis, supra note 25, at 108.
77. See DOMESTIC COUNCIL, supra note 26, at 47.
78. BRIGGS, supra note 2, at 21.
79. Id. at 20. Since the late 1960s, Mexico's gross national product has increased at an
annual rate of six percent, while her per capita income has increased at an annual rate of
only three percent. Id.
80. T. DERNBERG & D. MCDOUGALL, MACROECONOMICS 328-29 (4th ed. 1972).
81. BRIGGS, supra note 2, at 20.
82. Id.
83. Economy oMexico Fuels Influx of,41iens, L.A. Times, Sept. 18, 1977, pt. I, at 3, col.
i. United States officials believe that this is probably an underestimated figure made by the
Mexican government. The figure is probably closer to 50%. Mexico problems seen in birth-
rate, San Diego Evening Tribune, March 28, 1979, § A, at 25, col. 3.
84. Mondale Tells Mexicans U.S. WillHelp Economy, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1978, § 1, at
2, col. 3; Conine, supra note 6.
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that must continue for the time being."
The United States, a pulling force to many Mexicans, is
viewed as a "promised land," 9 offering the reverse of conditions in
Mexico. The vision may seem exaggerated to Americans, but to
Mexicans who have known nothing but poverty as a way of life, the
contrast is dramatic. In 1976, the per capita income in Mexico was
$1,130;9 0 in the United States the per capita income was $6,995. 9'
For Mexicans in general, the difference is inspiring. For Mexicans
seeking employment despite the level of salary, the United States
job market offers better opportunity than Mexico's. Although the
United States is experiencing high unemployment, Mexican trans-
migrants find work easily; they accept lower-than-standard pay and
working conditions, and American employers are eager to exploit
such a "black market" of labor.92 As a pull force, the promise of
employment is drawing Mexicans northward to a number of inter-
dependent twin-cities along the border.93 From there, trans-
migrants are moving in great numbers to major cities in the United
States.94
The cause of transmigration is not a mystery. Depressed socio-
economic conditions in Mexico are pushing Mexicans out, and
favorable conditions in the United States are pulling them north-
ward. Employment push and pull forces appear to be the most
powerful of all. The United States government has considered so-
lutions to employment pull forces within the United States, but a
proper treatment of those forces has not been formulated and
agreed upon.
88. Illegal Aliens - Where to Draw the Line, supra note 20.
89. BRIGGS, supra note 2, at 19; see SAMORA, supra note 22, at 10.
90. 1979 THE WORLD ALMANAC 559.
91. Id. at 591.
92. Strictly speaking, there is a black market of employment but not of employees,
because it is not illegal for employers to hire transmigrants in the United States, except in
California and Louisiana. See note 117 infra.
93. R. FERNANDEZ, THE UNITED STATES-MEXICO BORDER 113-18 (1977). See also text
accompanying notes 213-17 infra.
94. Border Town Growth Tied to Alien lnflux, L.A. Times, Feb. 3, 1979, pt. I, at 12, col.
1.
Illegal Mexican aliens are able to "disappear" into the diverse mix of Latin and
Central American groups living in New York. No one will even venture a guess on
how many Mexicans have arrived in New York and in other Eastern cities in the
last couple of years. Indeed, federal authorities have balked lately at giving esti-
mates on any aspect of the problem of illegal or undocumented aliens.
Illegal Mexican Aliens Now Flowing to Northeast U. S, supra note 41.
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C. Attempts by the United States to Halt Transmigration
United States concern for the harmful effects of transmigration
has been demonstrated by a variety of proposals, including new
legislation and efforts to enforce existing laws. Recent proposals
have ranged from more intense border control95 to legalized trans-
migration.96 In actual practice, the United States government,
through the INS, has used deportation and border enforcement as
its primary policy instruments. 97
1. Deportation. The Immigration and Nationality Act of
195298 and subsequent amendments give federal officers the author-
ity to deport illegal aliens.9 9 Deportation is also a right derived
from international law principles; it is well accepted that a nation
has the right to deport aliens for its own protection.1°° In the past,
the United States government has used deportation as a policy tool.
In 1953-1954, the INS boldly launched a program known as "oper-
ation wetback,"'' which resulted in nearly one million apprehen-
sions. In the summer of 1976, a $2 million deportation experiment
was run by the INS. 0 2 Apprehended transmigrants were placed on
airplanes in major cities and flown to Mexico City. The INS be-
lieved that flying the transmigrants deep into the interior of Mexico
would make return to the border more difficult and, therefore, ef-
fect a decline in repeat offenders.
10 3
95. Illegal Aliens, supra note 20.
96. UCLA Professor Urges Shift in Mexico Immigration, San Diego Union, Nov. 13,
1978, § A, at 9, col. 1. For accounts of proposals to create a Bracero-type program, see Lt.
Gov. Curb Visits Leveled Camp of Aliens, L.A. Times, July 24, 1979, § II, at i, col. 1;
Ehrlichman, Mexican Aliens Aren't a Problem ... They're a Solution, ESQUIRE, Aug. 1979,
at 61; Nixon Urges New Bracero Program, L.A. Times, Jan. II, 1979, pt. I, at 3, col. 3; H.R.
SELECT COMM. ON POPULATION, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., FINAL REPORT 28 (Comm. Print
1979) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
97. See notes 98-107 infra.
98. The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-503(1952).
99. The Mexican Constitution gives similar authority to the Federal Executive: "The
Federal Executive shall have the exclusive power to compel any foreigner whose remaining
he may deem inexpedient to abandon the national territory immediately and without the
necessity of previous legal action." CONSTITUTI6N POLITfCA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEX-
ICANOS, art. 33 (Mexico 1917).
100. In the words of the Court in Fong Yue Ting v. US., 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893): "The
right to exclude or to expel all aliens, or any class of aliens, absolutely or upon certain condi-
tions, in war or in peace ...is an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and
independent nation, essential to its safety, its independence and its welfare."
101. DOMESTIC COUNCIL, supra note 26, at 70; SAMORA, supra note 22, at 8.
102. 20 Here Fly Alien Airlf/ to Mexico, San Diego Union, July 22, 1976, § B, at 1, col. 2;
50 IllegalAliens To Leave Today, San Diego Union, July 23, 1976, § B, at 4, col. 1; see also
Champagne For Everybody, San Diego Union, July 28, 1976, § A, at 3, col. 5.
103. Id.
12
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1 [1980], Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol10/iss1/5
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
Since 1976, deportation has played a diminishing role in the
portfolio of INS immigration policy tools.'" This is attributable in
part to the priorities set by former INS Commissioner Castillo, who
INS employees believe was overly sympathetic to the Mexican
transmigrant's situation. 0 5 Castillo may have been responding to
protests made by Mexicans of deportation practices. 1 6  For
whatever reasons, INS forces have been redistributed from the inte-
rior of the United States to the international border - that is,
Castillo de-emphasized deportation and concentrated on the exclu-
sion of transmigrants. 07
2. Exclusion - Border forces and blockades. Protective ac-
tivity of the INS is carried out primarily by the Border Patrol Divi-
sion, 0 8 whose function is to capture transmigrants as they attempt
to enter the United States. Border Patrolmen are aided by strategi-
cally located fences"° and helicopters." 0
The success of this combination of obstacles is best told in one
Border Patrolman's account:
Our men stand on the California side of the border and watch
the groups forming across the line in Mexico .... When the
first groups start across, our men move in, then other groups
surge across and get away. From sheer weight of numbers and
fast movement they make it across.'
Despite the presence of border opposition, transmigrants continue
to cross into the United States in large numbers." 52 Legislators and
other government officials have come to realize that transmigration
cannot be treated symptomatically" 3 - legislation must address
the "causes" of transmigration.
104. IllegalAliens - Where to Draw the Line, supra note 20, at 29.
105. See note I I supra; Illegal Aliens Stir Competing Power Blocs, supra note 12.
106. See, e.g., 50 IllegalAliens To Leave Today, supra note 102. According to the article,
Mexican newspapers condemned the airlift program calling it "inhumane and degrading"
and demanded it be denounced before the United Nations.
107. BRIGGS, supra note 2, at 19; INS Halts Most 'Raids'on Factoriesfor Illegal Aliens,
supra note 6; Illegal Aliens - Where to Draw the Line, supra note 20, at 29.
108. 1976 INS REPORT, supra note 4, at 13.
109. Fence Was Meant To Cut, Builder Says, San Diego Union, Oct. 28, 1978, § A, at 1,
col. 2.
110. Mexican Alien Solution's Just Four Years Away, San Diego Union, Oct. 1, 1978, § C,
at 1, col. 6.
11I. Reforms CalledKey to Alien Problem, San Diego Union, March 21, 1976, § A, at 15,
col. I (statement of A.J. Gilman, Asst. Chief of the Chula Vista sector of the Border Patrol).
112. Hearings on HR. 982, supra note 24, at 34.
113. See note 20 supra.
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3. Attention to pull forces. The primary pull force in the
United States is the existence of employment opportunities. 4 One
possible way to reduce the employment pull force is to eliminate
these opportunities." 5 Although United States laws make it illegal
for a transmigrant to seek employment," 6 American employers
may hire transmigrants with impunity," 7 except in California and
Louisiana." 8  Recent proposed federal legislation, however, would
place criminal and civil sanctions on the hiring of transmigrants in
the United States.' '
114. IllegalAliens - Where to Draw the Line, supra note 20.
115. The effectiveness of the sort of disincentives for employers suggested by Congress-
man Rodino has been observed in three localized attempts. One called "program coopera-
tion" was sponsored by the Denver District Office of the INS. The program involved the
voluntary support of local employers to combat the employment of transmigrants. The INS
reported limited success in its 1976 Annual Report. The other two attempts are being made
by the State of California and the State of Louisiana. To protect workers within the state,
criminal sanctions have been imposed on employers who knowingly employ transmigrants.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805 (West 1971) reads in full as follows:
(a) No employer shall knowingly employ an alien who is not entitled to law-
ful residence in the United States if such employment would have an adverse effect
on lawful resident workers.
(b) A person found guilty of violation of subdivision(a) is punishable by a
fine of not less than two hundred ($200) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500)
for each offense.
(c) The foregoing provisions shall not be a bar to civil action against the em-
ployer based upon a violation of subdivision (a).
The constitutionality of the statute was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in
DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). In the words of the Court: "In attempting to protect
California's fiscal interests and lawfully resident labor force from the deleterious effects on its
economy resulting from the employment of illegal aliens, § 2805(a) focuses directly upon
those essentially local problems and is tailored to combat effectively the perceived evils." Id.
at 357. Transmigrants continue to pour into California, however, and many are merely
heading for other states to seek employment. Furthermore, enforcement is limited to state
authority. It is difficult to determine from this evidence what the effect would be of nation-
wide sanctions. The Louisiana law, which was only recently enacted, is printed in part at
note 118 infra.
116. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14)(1976).
117. Included in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 as a concession to Texan
agricultural interests, the so-called "Texas proviso" reads: "Provided, however, That for the
purposes of this section, employment (including the usual and normal practices incident to
employment) shall not be deemed to constitute harboring." 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a)(1976);
BRIGGS, .supra note 2, at 17.
118. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805 (West 1971) is printed in full at note 115 supra. The Louisi-
ana law reads in part as follows:
No person ...shall knowingly hire ...an alien who is not entitled to lawful
residence in the United States; provided however, that the provisions of this Part
shall not apply to aliens employed in the production of raw agricultural crops; or
horticulture, livestock, dairy or poultry products; nor to aliens engaged in the field
of animal husbandry. . ..
1979 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1085 (West) (to be codified as LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 992 (West)).
119. See note 31 supra, and note 120 infra.
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The Rodino bills 20 each proposed a three-step sanction
against employers who "knowingly" hire transmigrants. The first
offense would result in a warning by the Attorney General; the sec-
ond offense would be punishable by not more than $500 per trans-
migrant; and further offenses would be punished by a fine not to
exceed $1000, imprisonment of up to one year, or both. The bill
was passed by the House of Representatives twice and ignored both
times by the Senate; a third attempt failed when the bill died in the
House.' 21 Former Attorney General Griffin Bell and Secretary of
Labor F. Ray Marshall were also vehement in their pleas for the
enactment of legislation such as that proposed by Representative
Rodino.
22
4. Recentproposals. In June 1977, President Carter proposed
legislation'23 that would tighten border controls, impose civil fines
on employers who knowingly hire illegal aliens, improve economic
aid to Mexico, and legalize the presence of illegal aliens living in
the United States prior to January 1, 1977.124 Because of its com-
plexity, the Carter bill died in the Senate Judiciary Committee. 25
It was followed in May 1978 by a bill proposing the creation of a
Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy 26 to study




The United States government has treated transmigration as a
contest between itself and the individual transmigrant. Conse-
quently, all attempts by the government to contain transmigration
120. H.R. 16188, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). "The Senate took no action on the bill."
XXVIII CONG. Q. ALMANAC 537 (1972); H.R. 982, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). "The bill was
designed to deal with the displacement of American workers by illegal aliens who could be
hired to work longer for less pay. The Senate did not act on the measure in 1973." XXIX
CONG. Q. ALMANAC 854 (1973); H.R. 8713, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); see XXXI CONG. Q.
ALMANAC 551 (1975); see also H.R. 9531, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977).
121. Id.; DOMESTIC COUNCIL, supra note 26, at 112.
122. See note 20 supra.
123. See note 31 supra.
124. Transmigrants living in the United States continuously since January I, 1970, were
to be given permanent legal status, while the others would be given legal status for five years
after which time they would have been eligible to receive permanent legal status. Even this
feature of the plan met with Chicano-based opposition. See 2 Chicano Leaders Denounce
Carter Immigration Plan, San Diego Evening Tribune, June 27, 1978, § A, at 7, col. 1.
125. Conine, supra note 6.
126. H.R. REP. No. 1206, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978).
127. Id. at 3-4.
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have been implemented through the domestic legal system. Pres-
ently, the only illegal acts associated with transmigration are entry
into the United States and the procurence of employment.'28
Barricading the border with INS officers, fences, and helicop-
ters only addresses the symptoms of the problem. 29 Transmigrants
are not to blame for the problem; they are merely victims of condi-
tions in Mexico and prey to conditions in the United States. Push
and pull forces cause transmigration, and United States domestic
laws are powerless to affect push conditions on the Mexican side of
the border.'3 ° If the United States is to protect itself from the effect
of these push conditions, Mexico, as well as her transmigrants, must
be the subject of United States immigration policy. Immigration
policy must be extended beyond technical boundaries and become
an integral part of United States foreign policy.
II. MEXICAN TRANSMIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Broadly defined, foreign policy is a nation's method of relating
with foreign nations.131 Because international law provides princi-
ples governing the interactions of nations, it also provides guide-
lines for the formation of every nation's foreign policy. 13 2 This
Comment will discuss and define those international guidelines re-
lating to Mexican transmigration, and then recommend a new
United States foreign policy following those guidelines.
A. Introduction
The duty of a nation to prevent mass transmigration from
within its borders has not been specifically acknowledged or denied
in international law. The situation between the United States and
Mexico is unique. Presently, there is no other example of such ex-
treme economic disparity between neighboring countries as exists
between the United States and Mexico. 133 Nevertheless, there is
historical recognition of transmigration as a domestic issue. For
example, in the late 1800s, Max Weber expressed concern over the
injurious economic and social effects occurring in Germany, result-
ing from Polish transmigration to escape poverty in Poland and at-
128. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14)(1976).
129. See Problem of IllegalAliens Linked to Mexico's Woes, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1977,
§ 1, at 18, col. 6.
130. C. EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (1928).
131. See C. FENWICK, FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1968).
132. Id. at 3.
133. Maxwell, supra note 8, at I, col. 2.
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tain employment security in Germany. 134 No international law
developed as a result of that situation, however.
The problems of mass transmigrations have also received at-
tention in international arenas. In 1969, Pope Paul VI wrote in an
apostolic letter that transmigrations should be "the result, not of
compulsion, but of free choice by the human person"'' 35 and that
"governing authorities of states should be concerned that sources of
work are created in their own regions."' 136 Statements of the Pope,
such as these quoted, are understood to "enunciate moral principles
which are universal in application."'' 37 More recently, the world
has seen a reaction by members of the United Nations to the plight
of Vietnamese refugees (boat people).' 38 Vietnam has received in-
ternational pressure to curb the flow of the boat people from her
territory. 13 9 This pressure resulted from disapproval of the risks
boat people have been forced to take to escape Vietnam and of the
burden placed on neighboring Southeast Asian countries by this
transmigration. 40 As a result, on July 21, 1979, Vietnam pledged
before a United Nations sponsored conference on Indochinese ref-
ugees that she would "make every effort to stop illegal depar-
tures" '41 of refugees.
What follows is an examination of recognized international
law applicable to cases analagous to transmigrations - that is,
cases where similar types of problems are created. There is consid-
erable support for the proposition advanced here that a nation, in
this case Mexico, owes a duty to prevent the transmigration of its
own citizens.
B. The Responsibility of Mexico
1. International law recognized by Mexico and the United
States. Whatever its source, international law does bind nations,
because, as Brierly explains, "[M]an is constrained . . . to believe
134. R. BENDIX, MAX WEBER - AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT 17-23 (1962).
135. POPE PAUL VI, NEW NORMS FOR THE CARE OF MIGRANTS 9 (1969).
136. Id.
137. REV. J. CRONIN, CATHOLIC SOCIAL PRINCIPLES 56 (1950). The position of the Pope
as a leader of the Holy See is unique in international law, since his institution enjoys
"Supreme Spiritual Sovereignty." Kunz, The Status of the Holy See in International Law, 46
AM. J. INT'L LAW 311 (1952). The view today is "that the Holy See does, in fact, enjoy
international personality." R. GRAHAM, VATICAN DIPLOMACY, A STUDY OF CHURCH AND
STATE ON THE INTERNATIONAL PLANE 201 (1959).
138. Vietnam Agrees to Curb Refugee Flow, L.A. Times, July 22, 1979, pt. I, at I, col. 1.
139. Id.
140. See id.
141. Id. (statement of Kurt Waldheim, United Nations Secretary General).
Vol. 10
17
Bettwy: Mexican Transmigration: A Case for the Application of Internation
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1980
MEXICAN TRANSMIGRATION
that order and not chaos is the governing principle of the world in
which he has to live."' 14 2 Yet, thinking is divided on the source of
specific international law rules. One school of thought teaches that
nations are bound by "fundamental" rights and duties derived
from natural law.' 43 Another teaches the "doctrine of positivism,"
which states that international law is the whole of rules to which
nations have consented to be bound, either expressly in a treaty or
impliedly by customary rule.'" Both sources are valid for the pur-
pose of discussing guidelines for the United States and Mexico,
since both nations have agreed, by express treaty provisions and by
customary practice, to be bound by fundamental rights and duties
in international law.'
45
Mexico and the United States have, in the course of their dif-
ferences, entered into claims conventions - in particular, the Con-
ventions of 1868146 and 1923. ' 7 Although conventions are not
considered an expression of positive rules of international law, they
are evidence of the customary practice between the parties.' 4 8 The
United States and Mexico agreed to be bound by "principles of
international law, justice and equity"'' 49 in the 1923 Convention
and "according to public law, justice and equity" in the 1868 Con-
vention.' 50
Treaty law between the United States and Mexico provides
more definitive evidence of positive rules of international law bind-
ing the two nations. One important agreement to which the United
States and Mexico are signatories is the Charter of the Organization
of American States (OAS Charter). 5 ' In Article 5, each member
reaffirms the basic principle that "[i]nternational law is the stan-
142. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 57 (5th ed. 1955).
143. Id. at 50.
144. Id. at 52.
145. See notes 146-57 infra, and accompanying text..
146. Claims Convention, July 4, 1868, 15 Stat. 679, T.S. No. 212.
147. Convention Between the United States and Mexico for Reciprocal Settlement of
Claims, Sept. 8, 1923, 43 Stat. 1730, T.S. No. 678.
148. U.N. Doc. E/ECE/136 (1952), cited in 3 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 930-31 (1964).
149. See note 147 supra.
150. See note 146 supra. The United States and Mexico agreed on similar principles in
two multilateral conventions as well. See Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec.
26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881; Convention on the Status of Aliens, Feb. 20, 1928, 46
Stat. 2753, T.S. No. 815.
151. Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361 [hereinafter cited as O.A.S. CHAR-
TER], reprinted in H. DE VRIES & J. RODRIQUEZ-NOVAS, THE LAW OF THE AMERICAS 222
(1965).
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dard of conduct of States in their reciprocal relations."' 52 Subse-
quent provisions of the OAS Charter define international law as
fundamental rights' 5 3 to sovereignty, 54 independence,'55 equal-
ity, ' 56 and self-preservation. 57
These fundamental rights are the source of two particular du-
ties that arise in Mexico because of transmigration: (1) the duty to
respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the United States
and (2) the duty to prevent injury to the United States. It is shown
below that these duties require that Mexico prevent the current
transmigration into the United States. Mexico's conduct and pos-
sible defenses are then considered. Charter provisions of the
United Nations and the Organization of American States are also
discussed as the source of Mexico's duty to cooperate economically
with the United States in the satisfaction of her general duty to pre-
vent transmigration. Then, assuming that the propounded set of
international rights and duties applies, and that the duties of Mex-
ico are neither fulfilled nor excused, this Comment proposes possi-
ble remedies and solutions.
2. The duty to respect United States sovereignty. Transmigra-
tion violates a United States statute (8 U.S.C. § 1182) that has
unique significance in international law. The power of a nation to
forbid transmigration into its territory is "inherent in sovereignty
and essential to self-preservation . 158s. Unlike other domestic
laws of order, immigration laws designed to exclude certain or all
aliens are considered a fundamental sovereign attribute. 159 It fol-
lows, therefore, that any nation which would condone the violation
152. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 5.
153. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 8.
154. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 5(b).
155. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 5(b).
156. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 6.
157. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 9.
158. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). The power to expel
aliens is subject to limitations imposed by fundamental notions of morality and humanity,
but lesser limitations exist for the power to exclude aliens. Fifth Report of the International
Law Commission on International Responsibility, [1960] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 58-60,
U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/125 (1960). In an instruction to the American Embassy in Madrid, then
Secretary of State Dulles said, "It has been pointed out... that the decision to admit or to
refuse admission to Spain is one for the Spanish Government alone to make, and that the
United States has no basis on which to demand Mr. .. 's admission to that country." J.
Dulles, Instruction No. A-294 (June 5, 1958), reprinted in 8 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 573 (1965).
159. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603-09 (1889); Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 704-09 (1893); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587-88 (1952).
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of another nation's immigration laws condones an interference with
that nation's very right to territorial sovereignty and inviolability.
The right to exclude aliens has been exercised by the United
States through enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 and subsequent amendments. 60 Mexico also exercises
its right to exclude aliens and strictly enforces its immigration and
alien employment laws. 16 ' Neither country denies the other its
right under international law to enforce its own immigration laws,
but does either country recognize its duty to prevent violations by
its nationals of the other nation's immigration laws?
It is an accepted principle that "the rights of states under gen-
eral international law are always the reflection of the duties im-
posed by general international law upon other states." 162 The OAS
Charter contains the following articles under the heading "Funda-
mental Rights and Duties of States":
Article 7
Every American State has the duty to respect the rights enjoyed
by every other State in accordance with international law.
Article 8
The fundamental rights of States may not be impaired in any
manner whatsoever.
16 3
More specifically stated, the duty would be "to abstain and prevent
agents and subjects from committing acts constituting a violation of
another state's independence or territorial supremacy. . ."6 or, in
this case, the duty of Mexico to prevent its nationals from entering
the United States in violation of United States immigration laws.
The uniqueness of this violation under international law is
that, unlike other violations of international law, a violation of ter-
ritorial sovereignty does not necessarily involve an injury to the of-
fended nation. 6  Note, for example, the violation of Argentina's
sovereignty by Israel, who, without the permission of Argentina's
government, authorized agents to enter her territory and abduct
160. The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-503 (1952).
161. See notes 62 & 99 supra.
162. Kelsen, The Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 259,
264 (1950).
163. O.A.S. CHARTER arts. 7 & 8.
164. J. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 75-77 (2d ed. 1950) (em-
phasis added). See also I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 251 (4th ed. A. McNair
1928).
165. Baxter, Reflections on Codification in Light of the International Law of State Responsi-
bility/or injuries to Aliens, 16 SYRACUSE L. REV. 745, 750 (1965).
20
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Adolf Eichmann. 66 At the outbreak of World War I, when Mexico
needed to send troops from Nogales, Sonora, to Tijuana, Baja Cali-
fornia, via United States territory, United States consent was ob-
tained, and the Department of State made it clear that permission
was being granted.'67 Although the journey involved no threat of
injury, without the permission of the United States there would
have been a clear violation of United States territorial sovereignty.
There is no burden on the excluding nation to prove an injury
or otherwise justify its exclusion of aliens. 168  However, if trans-
migration is causing injurious effects to the United States economy,
then, in addition to there being a violation of United States sover-
eignty, the welfare and economic security of the United States are
being threatened. This gives rise to a second duty in the Mexican
government - the duty to prevent injury to the United States.
3. The duty toprevent economic injury. It is a well recognized
principle of international law that a nation can be held legally re-
sponsible for acts committed by its nationals within its territory,
which are injurious to another nation. 69 Every nation owes a "pri-
mary duty"' 70 to exercise "due diligence"'171 to prevent the occur-
166. Id. at 750 n.25. The Security Council adopted the following resolution, quoted here
in part, on June 23, 1960:
The Security Council,
Having examined the complaint that the transfer of Adolf Eichmann to the
territory of Israel constitutes a violation of the sovereignty of the Argentine Repub-
lic,
Considering that the violation of the sovereignty of a Member State is incom-
patible with the Charter of the United Nations ...
I. Declares that acts such as that under consideration, which affect the sover-
eignty of a Member State and therefore cause international friction, may, if re-
peated, endanger international peace and security;
2. Requests the Government of Israel to make appropriate reparation in ac-
cordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the rules of international
law ....
U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960), reprinted in 43 DEP'T STATE BULL. 116-17 (1960). Oppenheim
states: "The duty is to refrain from the performance of any act which would violate the
internal autonomy or the external independence of another state, such as the making of an
arrest by one state within another, or interference in the conduct of the latter's foreign pol-
icy." OPPENHEIM, supra note 164, at 262.
167. 5 DEP'T STATE BULL. 484 (1941).
168. The Court in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892), said, "Every
sovereign nation has power, inherent in sovereignty and essential to self-preservation, to for-
bid entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and
upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe." Id. at 659.
169. OPPENHEIM, supra note 164, at 307-08; EAGLETON, supra note 130, at 79-80; 2 J.
MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 446 (1906); C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW
301 (3d ed. 1948); U.S. v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 484 (1886).
170. H. BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 615 (2d ed. 1952).
171. See notes 191-93 infra, and accompanying text.
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rence of such injurious acts. Failure to perform this primary duty
of prevention gives rise to a "secondary duty."' 72 Under the secon-
dary duty, the nation, having failed to perform its primary duty,
must punish offenders and make reparations where required. 1
7 3
The first issue is whether the economic injury caused by trans-
migration is one which Mexico owes a fundamental duty, under
-international law, to prevent. In his work The Law of Nations, the
publicist Vattel wrote that anything harmful gives rise to the pri-
mary duty of prevention:
The Nation, or the sovereign, must not allow its citizens to injure
the subjects of another state, much less to offend that state itself;
and this not only because no sovereign should permit those
under his rule to violate the precepts of the natural law, which
forbids such acts, but also because Nations should mutually re-
spect one another and avoid any offense, injury, or wrong; in a
word anything which might be harmful to others.' 74
The duty to prevent injury to another nation's economy may
rest on more specific grounds than this. Nations have continually
demonstrated their belief that economic welfare is an international
concern by entering into treaties for economic cooperation.' 75 Two
aims of the United Nations are "to employ international machinery
for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all
persons. ." 176 and "[t]o achieve international cooperation in solv-
ing international problems of an economic. . . character. . . .",'7
The OAS Charter reaffirms the principle that "[e]conomic coopera-
tion is essential to the common welfare and prosperity of the peo-
ples of the continent."'1
7 8
All nations recognize the importance of their own economic
welfare, but the issue here is the extent to which they acknowledge
172. Borchard, The Law ofResponsibility ofStatesfor Damage Done in Their Territory to
the Person or Property of Foreigners, 23 AM. J. INT'L L. 131, 187 (Spec. Supp. 1929).
173. OPPENHEIM, supra note 164, at 308.
174. Mais d'un autre cbtM, la Nation, ou le Souverain, ne doit point souffrir que les
Citoyensfassent injure aux sujets d'un autre Etat, moins encore qu'ils offensent cet
Etat lui-mime. Et cela, non settlement parce qu'aucun Souverain ne doit permettre
que ceux quifont tous les ordres violent lesprkceptes de la Loi Naturelle, qui interdit
toute inure; mats encore parce que les Nations doivent se respecter mutuellement,
s'abstenir de tout offense, de toute kzion, de toute injure, en un mot, de tout ce quipeut
faire tort aux autres.
E. VATrEL, LE DROIT DES GENS, bk. II, ch.VI, § 72 (C. Fenwick trans. 1916) (THE LAW OF
NATIONS is the English translation of the title) (emphasis added).
175. See notes 176-78 infra.
176. U.N. CHARTER preamble, 11970] U.N.Y.B. 1001.
177. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, § 3.
178. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 5(i).
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a duty to protect the economic welfare of another nation. In cases
where a nation has claimed damages for the injurious conduct of
private foreign nationals, the primary duty of prevention has been
recognized, particularly for injury caused by air pollution, 79 mob
violence, 180 and counterfeiting.' 18  Counterfeiting is the conduct
most analagous to transmigration.
Preventing economic injury is not always a recognized duty; in
commerce, for example, a nation assumes the risk of economic loss.
It is well recognized, however, that a nation may protect its econ-
omy by making counterfeiting illegal, and that nations shall en-
deavor to prevent the counterfeiting of another nation's currency
within its territory. 82 Similarly, it is a principle of international
law that a nation may protect itself by making and enforcing laws
that exclude aliens, and it is suggested above that other nations owe
a duty to prevent activity within their territory that threatens to vio-
late those protective laws. Moreover, the analogy of transmigration
to counterfeiting is particularly appropriate, because the laws that
prohibit these activities are, in both cases, designed to protect a na-
tion from economic injury.
83
Traditionally, nations have associated the security of their
monetary systems with their fundamental right to exist. 184 Coun-
terfeiting causes economic harm, because it is a subversive injection
of money into a nation's monetary system, 85 which undermines the
value of the victim nation's currency and thwarts attempts by that
179. The decision in The Trail Smelter Case (United States v. Canada), III R. Int'l Arb.
Awards 1905 (1941) expresses the modern accepted view on air pollution:
Under the principles of international law, as well as the law of the United
States, no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the proper-
ties of the persons therein.
Id. at 1965, reprinted in 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684, 716 (1941).
180. Janes Claim (United States v. Mexico), United States-Mexico, General Claims
Commission (1926), reprinted in BRIGGS, supra note 170, at 605-11 (Mexican authorities
failed to take effective steps to apprehend the man who shot Janes); Youmans Claim (United
States v. Mexico), United States-Mexico, General Claims Commission (1926), reprinted in
BRIGGS, supra note 170, at 705-1l (Mexico showed a lack of due diligence in the punishment
of nationals implicated in mob violence in the United States).
181. M. GARCIA-MORA, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR HOSTILE ACTS OF PRI-
VATE PERSONS AGAINST STATES 151 (1962); U.S. v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (1886).
182. U.S. v. Atjona, 120 U.S. 479, 484 (1886).
183. See note 12 supra.
184. GARCIA-MORA, supra note 181, at 131-32.
185. The effect is to undermine the value of the money counterfeited and to create infla-
tion. Napoleon I was considered a master counterfeiter or faux-monnayeur. In his wars
against Austria, England, and Russia, he made use of this tactic to debilitate those nations'
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nation to control its money supply. In a similar fashion, transmi-
gration, by contributing to "dollar drain," causes uncontrollable
changes in the money supply of the United States.
86
The concept that a nation's money should be protected from
counterfeiting has expanded with the growth of international com-
merce. 87 Today, the security of a nation's monetary system is as
important internationally as it is domestically. It is recognized, for
example, that a nation has a fundamental right to protect its bal-
ance-of-payments.18 8 As a result of developed economic practice,
the right of a nation to protect itself economically is now expressed
in broad terms; Article 23 of the OAS Charter reads in pertinent
part: "Each State has the right to develop its cultural, political and
economic life freely and naturally."' 89 A nation's duty under the
OAS Charter is likewise as broad and clear: "The member States
should make every effort to avoid policies, actions, or measures that
have serious adverse effects on the economic or social development
of another Member State."' 90
Given the status of economic protection in international law,
the duty of Mexico becomes clear. To the extent transmigration
contributes to American economic instability and impairs the right
of the United States to protect its economy, Mexico owes a duty to
use due diligence to prevent transmigration.
4. Possible defenses. The first question to ask is whether
Mexico has satisfied her duty to exercise due diligence to prevent
Mexican transmigration. The answer will revolve around the defi-
nition of due diligence, which is unsettled in international law.
Some tribunals have supported a definition requiring that govern-
ments exercise available means.19' Other tribunals have supported
the definition advanced by the United States that governments
must do what is required to prevent injury.' 92 Under either defini-
tion, a nation's government is not expected to prevent acts commit-
ted in secrecy or by surprise. 19 3 Mexico, however, is aware of its
transmigration and has unofficially revealed it will make no effort
186. See note 61 supra.
187. U.S. v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 484-87 (1886).
188. NUSSBAUM, supra note 185, at 475-76.
189. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 30 (emphasis added).
190. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 34 (emphasis added).
191. Borchard, supra note 172, at 188.
192. Case of Salvador Prats, reprinted in EAGLETON, supra note 130, at 88-89.
193. FENWICK, supra note 169, at 301.
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to prevent its nationals from participating.' 94 Mexico has not,
therefore, satisfied its duty under either definition of due diligence.
The duty to exercise due diligence to prevent transmigration is
subject to one defense which Mexico would likely assert - self-
preservation. When a state is in real and imminent danger, it may
excusably infringe on the rights of other nations, 9 5 subject to the
limitation that the danger be avertable by no other means. 19 6 Ex-
perts agree that Mexico would be in great danger economically, po-
litically, and socially if transmigration were not allowed to
continue.' 97 The pertinent question, then, is whether these dangers
can be averted by means other than the continuation of transmigra-
tion.
This Comment suggests above that Mexican transmigration
will not solve Mexico's problems; transmigration is symptomatic
evidence of Mexico's underlying economic debility. Moreover,
transmigration is the cause of problems for the United States. The
problems and their sources - push and pull forces - have been
identified as economic in nature. 98 If there exists a means to elimi-
nate or otherwise relocate these forces - that is, an alternative to
transmigration for Mexico to handle her severe internal prob-
lems - the defense of self-preservation becomes untenable. Be-
cause the nature of the transmigration problem strongly suggests an
international economic approach to the solution, one must examine
whether economic cooperation by Mexico is an alternative means of
self-protection, which she ought to pursue to protect the United
States from injury.
For Mexico to agree to economic cooperation, two criteria
must be met: (1) Mexico may not be subjected to either the imme-
diate danger transmigration now averts or any new dangers that
could threaten Mexico's existence, and (2) seeking economic coop-
eration with the United States must satisfy Mexico's primary duty
194. There has, nevertheless, been a recent agreement between Governor Roberta de la
Madrid of Baja California Norte and Michael Walsh, United States Attorney for the South-
ern District of California. In the agreement, Mexico's full cooperation was pledged to iden-
tify and prosecute major transmigrant smugglers. The objective is to reduce border violence
and the exploitation of transmigrants. Mexico has not, however, otherwise committed itself
to preventing transmigration. Walsh, 4 Light At Both Ends Of The Border Tunnel, San Di-
ego Union, July 1, 1979, § C, at 3, col. I; see also Roundup Of The People Smugglers, NEWS-
WEEK, July 30, 1979, at 38.
195. 0. SVARLIEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF NATIONS 123 (1955).
196. Id.; I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 297-99 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955).
197. Maxwell, supra note 8.
198. See text accompanying notes 74-94 supra.
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to use due diligence to prevent transmigration.'99
The first criterion could be met if the United States allowed
transmigration to continue to the degree necessary to avert immedi-
ate danger to Mexico and if Mexican concessions in a cooperative
economic program would not endanger Mexico in new ways. The
recommendation offered below is meant to secure both for Mexico.
The second criterion is more difficult to meet because of the
standing United States definition of due diligence. If the United
States will require success in a cooperative effort before it will ac-
knowledge the satisfaction of Mexico's duty, then it is unlikely
Mexico will pursue the effort.
Success, in this case, cannot be guaranteed. The United States
must therefore use one of two tactics - either change its strict in-
terpretation of due diligence or agree by treaty to acknowledge a
satisfaction of Mexico's duty providing Mexico uses her best efforts
in the cooperative arrangement. The use of specific language in the
treaty could make Mexico's duty to perform more easily enforcea-
ble. 2
00
A second defense Mexico could raise regarding her inaction
toward the transmigration problem is the United States contribu-
tion to the problem.2°' United States statutes prohibit trans-
migrants from seeking employment in the United States, 20 2 but it is
clear these prohibitive laws are not a deterrent to transmigrants. As
long as United States law allows American employers to hire trans-
migrants with impunity, there is a strong argument that the United
States contributes to, and is perhaps wholly responsible for, the pull
forces that exist on the United States side of the international bor-
der. To overcome this defense, the United States could, of course,
pass and enforce laws prohibiting the employment of transmigrants
by United States employers, as recommended by Representative
Peter Rodino, former Attorney General Griffin Bell, President
Carter, and Secretary of Labor F. Ray Marshall.2 °3
199. If economic cooperation would not satisfy the primary duty, then Mexico could not
be expected to pursue it thereby changing her present position.
200. The United States might want to make clear in the treaty that this adhoc change in
position by the United States on the definition of due diligence does not suggest a general
change in the official stand.
201. See the revised draft of the Convention on International Responsibility of the State
for Injuries Caused in its Territory to the Person or Property of Aliens, submitted to the
International Law Commission by the Special Rapporteur, Garcia-Amador, [1961] 2 Y.B.
INT'L LAW COMM'N 48, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/34/Add. 1 (1961).
202. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1976).
203. See notes 120-23 supra, and accompanying text.
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There exists, however, a paradox in Mexico raising this de-
fense of United States contribution to the transmigration problem.
Mexico recognizes the necessity of transmigration to prevent an in-
ternal crisis, yet Mexico, by raising this defense, would accuse the
United States of allowing transmigration to continue. 2° If the
United States Congress were to pass a law today making the hiring
of transmigrants illegal, and. if the law were successful in drying up
pull forces in the United States, the diminution of transmigration
might be so harmful to Mexico that the United States could be ac-




Transmigration is not suggested here or anywhere to be such an
immediate threat to the United States that self-protection could jus-
tify harming Mexico. It is not the recommendation of this Com-
ment that such laws be immediately passed. The United States
should make Mexico aware, however, that refusal to pass such laws
is not to be interpreted as hypocrisy or used to assert estoppel
against the United States. Neither is it recommended that the
United States take a lenient stand on the transmigration issue.
Transmigration should be allowed to continue, but only as one part
of a cooperative economic effort with Mexico - an effort the
United States should forcefully insist Mexico join.
Economic cooperation, as an alternative means to transmigra-
tion, overcomes Mexico's defense of self-preservation; it is also the
most evident long-term solution to the prevention of transmigra-
tion. To prod Mexico into pursuing this course, the United States
must confront Mexico with her duty to prevent transmigration -
perhaps by insisting on the punishment of transmigrants who at-
tempt to enter the United States or by demanding the payment of
reparations from Mexico. The United States could, for example,
demand that Mexico reimburse the United States for the expense of
maintaining a border patrol and border fences. A friendlier ap-
proach might be, however, to confront Mexico with her duly to co-
operate economically with the United States.
5. The duly to cooperate economically. In 1948, the United
States and Mexico, with other American states, formed the Organi-
zation of American States.20 6 Two essential purposes of the organi-
zation are "to seek the solution of political, judicial and economic
problems that may arise among them"21 7 and "to promote, by co-
204. Maxwell, supra note 8.
205. Id.
206. See O.A.S. CHARTER, supra note 151.
207. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 4(d) (emphasis added).
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operative action, their economic, social and cultural develop-
ment. ' ' 20 8 Article 35 of the OAS Charter states the duty of the
member nations more specifically: "The member States agree to
join together in seeking a solution to urgent or critical problems
that may arise whenever the economic development or stability of
any Member State is seriously affected by conditions that cannot be
remedied through the efforts of that State. 2 °9
The question, then, is whether Mexico has cooperated eco-
nomically with the United States to halt transmigration. As a rule,
Mexico isolates herself economically by severely restricting foreign
investment and refusing to accept direct foreign aid. 2 '0 There are,
however, two examples of cooperation between the United States
and Mexico that are worth noting in the search for a solution to the
transmigration problem. One program, the Mexican Farm La-
bor 211 or Bracero program, allowed great numbers of Mexican na-
tionals, when needed by growers in the United States, to work as
farmworkers. The Bracero program was discontinued in 1965,
however, causing staggering unemployment in Northern Mexico.
212
The reaction to the high unemployment was an investment pro-
gram known as the Border Industrialization Program 213 (BIP) -
the second example of economic cooperation between the United
States and Mexico. Currently under the BIP, United States firms
may invest in a twelve and one-half mile deep zone in Mexico
along the United States-Mexico border, with only two require-
ments: that the entire production be exported, and that Mexican
labor be used exclusively.21 4
The BIP has been a success: in Northern Mexico, unemploy-
ment dropped from seventy percent in 1969 to ten percent in
1970.215 In the United States, American businessmen can finally
compete with East Asian manufacturers who also use "cheap" la-
208. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 4(e) (emphasis added).
209. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 35 (emphasis added).
210. See Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign Investment, passed
Feb. 16, 1973, effectire March 9, 1973, cited in VII MARTINDALE-HUBBEL LAW DIRECTORY
3766 (11 th ed. 1979); BRIGGS, supra note 2, at 21.
211. Agricultural Act of 1949, ch. 223, 65 Stat. 119 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1461-68
(195 1)). For an account of the program, see SAMORA, supra note 22, at 18-19.
212. FERNANDEZ, THE UNITED STATES-MEXICO BORDER 131-48 (1977).
213. See Comment, American Utilization of the Mexican Border Industrialization Pro-
gram, I CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 128 (1970); Big Deal at the Border, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 24, 1972,
at 59; see also Christman, Border Industries Foster New Jobs, More Experts, MEXICAN-
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bor.216 The BIP has, however, contributed to Mexican transmigra-
tion. Employment opportunities draw Mexicans northward where
they are attracted by even better employment opportunities in the
United States.2" 7
The concept of the BIP could, nevertheless, play a significant
role in preventing transmigration. Its implementation shows: (1)
Mexico is not entirely against wholly-foreign investment within her
borders, and (2) the migration of Mexicans can be affected by an
isolated investment region located within Mexico. BIP-type invest-
ment regions could foreseeably be established in the interior of
Mexico to divert the flow of transmigration. This possibility should
be scrutinized as part of a comprehensive cooperative economic
program between the United States and Mexico.21 8
C. Summary of Foreign Policy Recommendations
On the basis of the preceding analysis of the transmigration
problem and applicable international law, the following summa-
rizes those measures the United States and Mexico should take to
prevent Mexican transmigration:
1. The United States should finance impact studies of Mexi-
can transmigration. The problem needs to be observed quantita-
tively to determine whether efforts to relieve it are effective.
2. The United States should confront Mexico with her pri-
216. Id.
217. Border Town Growth Tied to Alien Influx, supra note 94.
218. Transmigration has recently been made an even more complex issue with the dis-
covery of abundant oil and natural gas resources within Mexico - resources desperately
needed by the United States. See Carter Pressed to Give In to Mexicans on Gas Prices, L.A.
Times, Feb. 11, 1979, pt. I, at 1, col. 4. United States and Mexican government officials deny
that negotiations on oil will make transmigration a negotiable item, that is, that Mexico will
seek a more lenient United States transmigration policy in exchange for Mexican oil and
natural gas. Such a trade, however indirectly proposed, is nevertheless likely. Maxwell,
supra note 8. Negotiations for oil between the United States and Mexico have already been
threatened by Chicanos who would have the Mexican government refuse to sell natural gas
to American companies who exploit transmigrants. New Tactics Being Used in Behalf of
Aliens, L.A. Times, Feb. 8, 1978, pt. I, at 3, col. I. A clear United States foreign policy on
transmigration is therefore necessary to future oil negotiations. Mexico's vast oil resources
could be the foundation for the economic development Mexico needs. Such development
could be coordinated with efforts to prevent transmigration and must at least be planned so
as not to aggravate transmigration. Assuming Mexico acknowledged her duty to cooperate
economically with the United States and Mexico were held to her duty of due diligence in
such an effort, she could make use of her development in the oil and gas industry to provide
a partial solution to the transmigration problem. For example, by providing employment
opportunities in the oil and gas industry, she could divert the flow of her transmigrating
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mary duty under international law to prevent transmigrants from
entering the United States. The United States should not allow its
own present inaction to be interpreted as leniency on the issue.
3. An Economic Development Commission" 9 should be es-
tablished by treaty between the United States and Mexico. The
Commission's purpose and goal would be to halt transmigration
into the United States by changing those economic conditions caus-
ing it. Those changes should be:
a. To relocate current employment pull forces by establishing
BIP-type investment regions in Mexico's interior. The goal would
be to divert the migration of Mexicans from their present destina-
tions - Mexico City and the United States - to the newly formed
investment regions by providing employment there. As Secretary
of Labor Marshall said, "Developing labor-intensive rural indus-
tries (in Mexico) is the key to dealing with [transmigration]
... 220 Investment laws in these regions must be liberal to at-
tract American and other foreign investors.
b. To continue attempts to regulate the flow of transmigrants
into the United States, but never to a degree that would be harmful
to Mexico. This regulation should be supported with manpower
and finances by both nations. If both countries contribute equally,
Mexico will thereby discharge her fundamental duty to prevent
transmigration to the extent the United States would exercise its
fundamental right to prevent it.
Ideally, the Economic Development Commission would co-
ordinate the effect of new legislation in both countries so trans-
migrants would not suffer from reduced employment opportunities
at any given time in the process. Employment opportunities would
be increased in Mexico as rapidly as they would be reduced in the
United States.22'
219. See, e.g., Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, Nov. 30, 1954, 6
U.S.T. 603, T.I.A.S. No. 3197.
220. Eaton, supra note 41. Also note that this proposal is in line with the papal policy of
"bringing the work to the workers, wherever possible, rather than drafting workers to the
scene of the work." POPE PAUL VI, supra note 135 (quoting POPE JOHN XXIII, PACEM IN
TERRIS 33-34 (1965)). The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank have a
similar objective to create industrial activity, employment, and income in isolated investment
regions in rural Mexico. Development Lending and Illegal Immigration: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Intl Dev. Institutions and Finance and Urb. Aff, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-15, 33-
37 (1977).
221. Compare this recommendation with that of the House Select Committee on Popula-
tion, which proposed that foreign assistance be offered to create industries and jobs in Mex-
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III. CONCLUSION
Mexicans are transmigrating to the United States in greater
numbers each year, yet the governments of Mexico and the United
States have taken no action.222 The United States government is
presently doing little to prevent transmigration, because it is
tethered by political interest groups; 22 3 the Mexican government
does nothing to prevent transmigration, because it is in Mexico's
economic best interest to allow it.
2 2 4
Transmigration is easing economic pressures in Mexico, but is
compounding economic pressures in the United States. Population
growth, unemployment, "dollar drain," and the use of government-
provided services and benefits are all being increased by transmi-
gration. 225 Past efforts by the United States government have not
succeeded in halting transmigration or in alleviating its effects, be-
cause the efforts have been unilateral, whereas the causes of trans-
migration - push and pull forces - are bilateral.226
Since the real causes of transmigration exist both in the United
States and in Mexico, there must be a cooperative attempt at pre-
vention by the two countries. Cooperation will not only assure im-
proved economic conditions in both countries but ameliorate the
plight of the victim caught in-between - the individual transmi-
grant.
Before the United States can expect Mexico to cooperate, how-
ever, it must prompt Mexico to recognize her duties under interna-
tional law. These duties are: the duty Mexico owes to prevent
transmigration; the responsibility Mexico assumes in case she fails
to perform the duty of prevention; and the duty Mexico owes to
engage in economic cooperation with the United States to alleviate
economic push forces. In short, the United States must formulate a
new foreign policy approach with Mexico on the issue of transmi-
gration, and international law provides the guidelines to that ap-
proach.
Samuel W Be/twy
ico's rural areas, and that the United States-Mexico border be sealed. FINAL REPORT, supra
note 96, at 26-28.
222. See note 3 supra.
223. See text accompanying notes 12-18 supra.
224. Illegal Aliens - Where to Draw the Line, supra note 20; Maxwell, supra note 8.
225. See text accompanying notes 22-73 supra.
226. See text accompanying notes 128-130 supra.
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